THE RESURRECTION OF REGISTRATION
OF TITLE
PERCY BoDwELL*

N A period of readjustment, old ideas which have lost their vogue are
likely again to be advocated along with ideas whose main attraction
is their novelty. In the dosing years of the nineteenth century and
the first two decades of the twentieth there was considerable agitation in
the United States for registration of title to land. In the prosperous
twenties, reform was quiescent, and with it the reform of land transfer.
But with the collapse of three of the four large New York title insurance
corporations as an incident of the great depression, title insurance again
came to public attention, and title registration was urged as something
better. As a consequence the ghost of title registration again walks in that
state.
In normal times reform is under a grave disadvantage. Vested interests are entrenched while the main strength of the reform is in the egoism
of the reformer. In times of change the advantage is perhaps the other
way. But in either case attention is likely to be centered on the special
interest of the existing order or on the personality of the reformer rather
than on the merits of the case. The merits of either side are likely to be
assumed and attention directed at discrediting the other side. So at any
rate has it been with registration of title to land. Its advocates have
largely assumed its manifest superiority over prevalent systems of recording and have harped on the self-interest of the English solicitors, or in
this country on that of the abstracters or the title insurance companies.
Self-interest, however, is not always on one side. There is no more insidious self-interest than that of a government department desiring to expand. Such a department exists in England in the Land Registry,' the
head of which, the Chief Land Registrar, is appointed by the Chancellor
and has his powerful backing. In the United States it is the titlemen and
especially the title insurance companies that are accused of self-interest.
Their self-interest is manifest. But the failure of past attempts at registration of title cannot altogether be laid to them. Their influence was not
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' The Land Registry was created in 1862 by Lord Westbury's Land Registry Act, 25 & 26
Vict., c. 53-
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sufficient to block legislation in many states2 nor, it is believed, does it
account for the ineffectiveness of most of that legislation.3 That ineffectiveness is an outstanding fact and should be examined dispassionately
for any light that it may throw on the merits of the case. Similar legislation was long ineffective in England. Without holding any brief for the
English, one cannot help being struck by the fact that they learn the lesson of ineffective legislation better than we do.
Registration of title to land is commonly associated in the United
States with one type of such registration, the Torrens System. The name,
"Torrens System," like the name "Townsend Plan," is known to countless persons who have only the haziest idea of the system or plan for which
the name stands. The name itself, therefore, has been of the greatest advertising value. It has lent itself to propaganda and the formation of
leagues4 or dubs. It has helped make the movement for the registration
of title seem a cause, and the system itself a panacea from which the most
beneficent results may be expected. By a simple change in land transfer,
land is to become liquid and credits established. Not all who advocate
registration of title to land would probably claim all this, but what else
can be meant by those who urge that land should be as easily transferable
as a ship or a share of stock or an automobile?s Certainly they are at
the opposite pole from the advocates of that other panacea, the Single
Tax, who would deny not only all resemblance between chattels and land
but also the private ownership of land.
2 Powell, Registration of the Title to Land in the State of New York 54-6 (1938) states
that exclusive of New York there are twenty-one subdivisions of the United States which have
had constitutional or legislative provisions dealing with the registration of title to land but
that of these only seven have made any substantial use of the system. To the fourteen where
the use has not been substantial should be added New York. Ibid., at 53. Of the seven where
the use has been substantial, two are outlying possessions, Hawaii and the Philippines, and
five are states, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Ohio.
3 The tendency to explain away the failure of title registration in these states by attributing
it to the malign influence of the titlemen is seen even in McDougal & Brabner-Smith, Land
Title Transfer: A Regression, 48 Yale L. J. 1146-8 (1939) and in Fairchild & Springer, A
Criticism of Powell's Book, 24 Cornf. L. Q. 557, 573-4 (i939). This is on the same level as
the charge that our entry into World War I was due to profiteers. The Satanic interpretation of history is all too common today but it does not get us anywhere.
4 Thus, Fairchild, co-author of the article in 24 Corn. L. Q. 557 (1939), is President of the
New York Torrens Title League.
s See McDougal & Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1126; Fairchild & Springer, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 576-7. This slogan goes back to the early history of the fight for title
registration in England. Both the slogan and much of the argument for title registration in the
United States have been taken from the English experience without due regard for their application here.
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However, the fact that advocates of the Torrens System have claimed
for it advantages that are beyond all reason should not blind us to any
merits it may have. If it cannot make land as liquid as a share of stock but
on the other hand promises better results than the system of land transfer
we now have, it is at any rate worth considering. In looking into the matter, the more we get away from names, whether the name be the Torrens
System or Registration of Title or Registration of Deeds, the better.
Without the prejudice and preconceptions that go with names we can discuss change in the mechanism of land transfer in the same temper in which
we would consider alteration of the rules of the road.6 No great moral
issue is involved, but simple matters, such as indexing and quieting and
insuring titles. Go beyond these and the changes become more radical,
and may even involve revamping of the general property law. Such a consequence may be an argument in favor of such changes, but, on the other
hand, if we do not desire such general modification of property law, this
may weigh heavily against the advantages, such as cheapness and quickness, which it is claimed ensue from governmental transfers with assured
title. In any case the matter is one of balancing conveniences after as
much as possible has been learned from experience.
Any advocate of title registration would do well to mark the struggle
for title registration in England, for a by-product of that struggle is the
most outstanding feat of title registration-the scrapping of the largest
part of that most characteristic segment of English real property law, the
historic law of estates.
Such far-reaching consequences would indicate that something more
than a simple change in the method of land transfer lay behind the struggle. Such, indeed, was the case. The proponents of free trade in England
a hundred years ago sought not only repeal of the corn laws but free trade
in land as well.7 At that time English land was commonly settled land.
This meant that land was tied up in families, that there were classes, and
that there was a tendency toward perpetuation of government by and in
the interests of landowners. On the other hand, free trade in land resulted
in commercialization of land, the putting of land on a par with chattels,
6This point is well made by McDougal & Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, when they
state: "Factually, the Torrens system is just a different, and more efficient, way of keeping
the public records" (ibid., n. 5), when they take up the steps in land transfer without the use
of the familiar phraseology (ibid., at I129-3o) and finally when they decry the sharp antithesis
between "recordation" and "registration" (ibid,, at 1149). Names are useful tools but too
easily run into conceptualism.
7For a most illuminating account of land law reform in England and its relation to the
movement for free trade, see Dicey, The Paradox of the Land Law, 2z L. Q. Rev. 221, 227
(19o).
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the breaking of the hold of the landed classes, and the greater utilization
of land. The register of title was significant at least as a symbol of free
trade in land.8 If, as was claimed, the register could make parcels of land
as freely transferable as chattels, free trade in land would be an accomplished fact. In 1862 the Land Register was adopted but it proved a great
disappointment. After a generation of trial, the number of registrations
was still negligible,9 and this despite the fact that by Lord Cairn's Land
Transfer Act of 187510 the registration of possessory titles was made "easy
and practical.""r
The evidence became convincing that unless registration of title were
made compulsory, it would amount to very little." Accordingly in 1899,
registration was made compulsory on sale in four parishes of the County
of London, and by 1902 compulsory registration was extended to the entire county.' 3 However, at least 94 per cent of the applications for first
registration in the County of London from 1899 to i909 proved to be for

possessory titles, 4 which type of registration had few of the advantages
claimed for the ideal system.' s A search of the title prior to the date of
registration was still necessary on each transfer and registration did not
make the title good.
Despite the limited success of title registration until this time, its advocates still had faith in it 6 and the fight for its extension went on. The
World War caused a suspension of law reform, but post-war psychology
was all in its favor and was also favorable to compromise. Between 1926
and 1936 there was a period of truce, during which no forced extension of
compulsory registration was to be made. 7 In the year following the truce,
8Ibid. at 222,

227; Dicey,

Law and Opinion in England

202 (i917).

9 In i895 less than one-third of one per cent of the land of England and Wales was on the
Register. Second and Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Land Transfer Acts, i9o8II, p. II.

xo38 & 39 Vict. c. 87 (1875).

11 Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9.
i.
I' Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9,at
13 Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9,at 21.
'4 Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9, at 26. As many as 56 per cent of the titles
were still not guaranteed in 1920. In the same year, 61 per cent of the titles in non-compulsory
areas were not guaranteed. Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 7. In 1938,
under the influence of the Property Acts of 1925, non-guaranteed titles had fallen to one per
cent in compulsory areas and to three per cent in non-compulsory areas. Ibid.
ISSecond and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9, at 30.
16 The Royal Commission on the Land Transfer Acts, I9o8-ii, came to the conclusion that
"the principle of such a Registry is, in our opinion, sound and valuable." Ibid., at 25.
'7Land Registration Act 1925, 15 Geo. V, c. 21, § X20 (2).
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extension was not to be imposed on more than a single county 8 and in any
case six months' notice was to be given of the proposed extension with provision for an iiaquiry as to its desirability.' 9
The truce was incident to vast changes in the land law and was agreed
upon to allow these to work themselves out.20 The peculiar triumph of
land registration was that it had a profound influence on these changes.2y
They were made with the view of fitting settled land for the Register and
at the same time of gaining for unregistered land many of the advantages
of registered land without resort to the Register. The .new system of private conveyancing, it was said at the time,
is, in fact, a "loose-leaf" registration of title. The document showing who is the person
for the time being able to deal with the legal estate in the land, and, where there is a
settlement, who are the trustees, corresponds to the entries in the Property and Proprietorship Registers, and any instruments creating mortgages correspond to the
entries in the Charges Register. These should be as simple as the entries in the Regispossession of
ters, but instead of being a book or file at the Registry, they are in the
22
the owner or mortgagee, and pass on a conveyance of the property.
Advocates of title registration urge that it does much more than this but
that is beside the point here. To have been an important factor in reducing legal estates in land to the fee simple absolute in possession and the
term for years absolute,'2 whether this be for better or for worse, is in itself no mean accomplishment.
The ten years' truce seems to have reduced the rancor over title registration. During this period, the provincial towns of Eastbourne and Hastings voluntarily accepted the compulsory system, the former in 1926, the
latter in 1929. In 1937, the system was extended to Middlesex.24 Croydon was added in 1939)25 and Surrey has been given notice of such a change
for 1940.6 All of Middlesex and Croyden and parts of Surrey are within
18 Ibid., § 122 (xi).

19Ibid., § 122 (i) (ii).
20

See Lightwood, The Future of Registration of Title, 75 L.J. 3 (1933).

21 The interrelation of "facility of transfer and simplification of title" was apparent from
the first proposal of the Register in r857 (see Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 49) and became even more apparent as time went on. The Royal Commission of i9o8-ri
said: "Experience of the working of the registration system shows, in our opinion, that it would
be greatly facilitated by improvements in the law of Real Property." Ibid. They then discussed various proposals which were the groundwork for the reforms of 1925. Ibid., at 49-53.
-64 Solicitors' J. 747 (192o); see Lightwood, Registration of Title, 69 LJ. 417 (1930).
23LawofPropertyAct I925,15 Geo. V, c. 20, § I (i). See 85 LJ. 4 (1938).

24Report of Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 5.
SIbid., at 3; 82 Solicitors' J. io55 (1938).
26Land Registration: Compulsory Areas, 82 Solicitors' j. 671 (1938).
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the Metropolitan police area, or "Greater London." Kent and Essex
would seem next in line both because their position is similar to that of
Surrey and because of the relatively large number of voluntary registrations.27 For the duration of the War, however, any extensions seem unlikely. The absence of the rancor that was formerly noticeable is seen in the
reply of the council of the Law Society, the solicitors' association, to the
notice of the proposed extension of compulsory registration to Croydon
and Surrey: "The council replied that their policy was not to obstruct
the extension of land registration in areas where it is proved to be desired,
but rather to do all they could to assist in making the working of such
extension harmonious and efficient." However, they added: "They are
assured by their provincial representatives that many areas in the country are not ready for the extension of registration."'

8

In any event, the

permanency of title registration in the vicinity of London seems assured.
Its gradual extension elsewhere seems to be assumed. 29 But for the greater
part of England it is a prospect rather than a reality. A less able Chief
Land Registrar, a let-down in the enthusiasm incident to the launching of
a new venture, some untoward incident, the disinclination of the rest of
England to follow London-any or all of these, or some other factor, may
mean that the movement started in London will prove to be but a ripple
that will soon wear itself out. Thus, in 1938, the finances of title registration showed a sudden reversal. An estimated surplus of £44,ooo became
a deficit of £ii,ooo. This was due to a drop in land values.30 Perhaps the
incident was not very important but nevertheless some of the glow was
taken out of the pictureY.3

English experience in the extension of title registration suggests several
conclusions. In the first place, without compulsory registration title registration was of small importance. From 1862, when the Register was
first instituted, until December 31, i909, there had been only 2,042 first
27In 1938, 18.7 per cent of non-compulsory registrations were in Kent and 15.2 per cent in
Essex. From there it dropped to 7.5 per cent in Sussex with the rest of England, except
Surrey, scattering. Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 8.
28I86 L. T. 34 (1938).
9Lord Tomlin's Land RegistrationCommittee of 1930 felt it to be outside the scope of their
authority to consider the advisability of extending the area of compulsory registration but they
were very complimentary as to the way in which the system as then constituted was working
and the whole drift of the report was toward the general adoption of the system throughout
England and Wales. Mr. Lightwood considered the report "tendencious" in that respect.
69 L. J. 347 (1930). See also 2 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer (N.S.) 295 (1938).
30 Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 2.
31 See

Lightwood, 87 L.J. 423 (9,39).
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registrations in England and Wales in voluntary areas.32 The pace had
quickened to 1,035 in the calendar year 1921, had slowed up for four

years and then gone ahead again in

1926

with the Property Acts of

1925

in effect. The peak was reached in 1936 with 4,915 first registrations.
Then the inclusion of Middlesex in the compulsory area caused a fallingoff in voluntary registrations.33 In 1938 there were some i,o9i voluntary
34
first registrations in areas not in the immediate vicinity of London.
These must have been scattering as apparently no county in this group
had as many as 7.5 per cent3 s of the total first registrations, or 265, with
an average per county36 of less than 24, or about the number of actions to
quiet title which one might expect in a single year in an average-sized
county in the Middle West of the United States. 37 The Law of Property
Acts of I95 greatly aided title registration so that the showing for voluntary registration since has been better than it was in the Report of the
Royal Commission in i91i38 but there has been no rush to the Register,
nor, apparently, is there likely to be. The example of Eastbourne in 1926
and of Hastings in 1929 in asking to become compulsory areas 39 has not
been followed. The general adoption of the Register as a means of transfer would seem to depend as much as ever on the extension of compulsory
areas on the initiative of the Privy Council. In the meantime, the mainstay of registration in non-compulsory areas has been its success in com40
pulsory areas.
In the second place, the register appears to be unsuitable for the multiple
common law estates. If the common law doctrine of estates is an anachronism, we should be as ready to discard it as we would an old shoe. But
is it an anachronism? Both in England and the United States there has
long been a movement to assimilate the law of real property to that of
personal property. The recent abolition "of copyhold tenure in England
and the abolition of feudal incidents there have made feudal tenure in
England merely nominal, and it has never been anything but a shadow, if
32Second and Final Report, op. cit. supra note 9, at 26.
33

Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 5.

There were 3,661 first registrations in non-compulsory areas (ibid.) and 29.8 per cent
of these were from counties other than Surrey, Essex, Kent and Sussex. Ibid., at 8.
3s This figure is given for Sussex. Ibid.
36 This is on the basis of the exclusion of six counties, London, Middlesex, Surrey, Essex,
Kent, and Sussex, from a total of fifty-two in England and Wales.
37 In 1938 there were eighteen such actions filed in Johnson County, Iowa, and this was said
to represent a decline.
38 Note 9 supra.
34

39

p. 474 supra.

40

See Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 2.
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that, in the United States since the Revolution. The same tendency is exemplified in England and in many of the United States by assimilation of
the law of testate and intestate succession to land to that of personalty.
But in the law of estates and especially future interests, the tendency has
been the other way. Although the law of estates has no technical application to personalty, when it comes to matters that count, it is treated as
though it had. There is good reason for this result. Were the law of estates and future interests abolished, we should be obliged to start all over
again with ideas based on the crude notions of property in chattels, or with
something like the civil law notion of dominium, or to throw the whole
into equity as has been done in England. No one of these three courses
seems desirable. Notions of property in chattels have been of the crudest
except insofar as these have been influenced by the law of real property.
It is no accident that we do not care to substitute for our own the far less
developed civil law conceptions of future interests. It is unnecessary to
make all future interests in land equitable because the need for a trustee
is not the same in the case of land as in the case of chattels, and because
we lack the English problem of the family settlement. To the writer, the
law of estates and future interests does not seem an anachronism, much as
it needs to be clarified in the, United States. If registration of title does
mean scrapping the law of estates and future interests, it would seem a
minor matter whether that scrapping occurs as a preliminary to the Register or as a consequence thereof. The important thing to bear in mind is
that the logic of registration of title is a revolution in our land law. More
is involved than mere changes in methods of transfer.
The English experience presents numerous other lessons for both advocates and opponents of title registration. One of these is that compulsory registration does not mean that all land need be brought immediately
on the register. Any such procedure would suggest the haste and confusion, say, of the NRA, or the high-handedness of the great military
empires of other days or of the authoritarian states of today. Under
the English scheme, registration, though compulsory, need not take
place until there is a sale. 4" In this way the haste, confusion, and

arbitrariness of a sudden shift of all land to the Register is avoided.
At the same time this avoids the anomaly of two active registers with
two systems of land transfer competing, if not in perpetuity, at least
for an indefinite period. Thus when Middlesex accepted the compulsory system, the old register of deeds was closed." The voluntary sys40Land Registration Act 1925, x Geo. V, C. 21, § 120 (i).
42 Report of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, p. 9. This was in pursuance to Land
Registration Act x936, 26 Geo. V and z Edw. VIII, c. 26, § 2.
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tem was based on the liberalism of the last century. But the right of the
owner of land to choose between an alphabetical index under the prevailing system and a tract index under registration hardly seems to be of the
essence of liberty.
The English experience suggests still other lessons. The higher cost of
initial registrations as compared with that of subsequent transfers 43 should
be noted. It is also worthy of note that although only a "good holding
title" and not a "marketable title" is necessary for registration as an "absolute title" 44 yet the antecedent claims that have thus been overridden
seem to have been negligible.45 This is some indication that courts have
been too fussy about marketable title.
In the controversy that has arisen over the failure of the New York
title insurance companies there has been a tendency on the one hand to
discount the English experience with title registration because of the difference in conditions 46 or on the other hand to overstate the relevance of
that experience and to deny the very obvious differences in conditions
47
that do exist.

As already pointed out there would seem to be much that can be learned
from the English experience that is relevant to our own. On the other
hand even though title registration should finally prevail throughout
England that would not be much of an argument for its adoption in the
United States. As has been pointed out, title registration in England was a
symbol and a tool in the fight for the free alienability of land. In the United
States land is freely alienable. In the greater part of England today conveyancing is still secret except insofar as this has been changed by the
Land Charges Act of 1925.48 As long ago as the Statute of Uses this secrecy was denounced and yet it has continued, incredible as this may seem.
But in the United States public transfers have existed from the first. Had
we no system of public transfers, it would behoove us to select one, and
43See Powell op. cit. supra note 2, at 285. The difference is likely to be greater in noncompulsory than in compulsory areas. In view of the heavy loss in non-compulsory areas
during 1938-9 the Chief Land Registrar reports that "the time may have come when the
permanent differences between the working of land registration in compulsory and non-compulsory areas should be reflected in the Fee Order in operation in the respective areas." Report
of the Chief Land Registrar for 1938-9, at 3.
44Land Registration Act 1925, 15 Geo. V, c. 21, § 13(c).
4sFor the relatively small losses from the insurance fund, see Powell, op. cit. supra note
2, at 285.

46 Ibid., at 56.
47 McDougal & Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1135-8; Fairchild & Springer, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 565-73.
48 i5 Geo. V, c. 22 (1925).
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certainly a case for title registration might be made. But we have such a
system, and the question with us is whether we shall supplant it. Under
these circumstances the case for title registration must be much stronger.
In the field of politics, the parliamentary form of government would seem
more democratic than the presidential. If we were working in a vacuum
we might adopt it. But we are not, and the relative merits of the two systems are academic.
Other differences between the English situation and our own have at
times been emphasized: the existence in England of a trained civil service
as compared with the prevalence of untrained politicians in public offices
in the United States, the freedom of England from a written constitution,
and our doctrine of separation of powers. Recent changes in constitutional theory have perhaps rendered our constitutions a less serious obstade to legislative change than they were a generation ago, but they still are
a realistic factor. The infiltration of much new blood into the civil service
would seem rather spasmodic and by no means to involve a purge of politics from the civil service. Constitutional difficulties no doubt tend to
promote delay, red tape, and greater expense, while an untrained civil
service tends to inefficiency and waste. These factors are perhaps not decisive but their weight cannot be ignored.
Finally the problem of statutory reform in the United States is very different from that in England because of the federal character of our government. As it stands, the common law has some coherence and uniformity
throughout the country. The recording acts date back to Colonial times
and have become as substantially a part of our common law as are the
early English statutes. They are an integrated part of the American
land law. If the land law were federal, we could make a more or less
revolutionary change in it by congressional act and still have an American land law. The same kind of change by a state statute would
merely add that state to Louisiana as a peculiar jurisdiction. Instead of
progress toward uniformity the result is likely to be increased divergence
and local law. An outstanding example of this is the New York Revised
Statutes of 1829. They have been compared to the English property legislation of I925.49 The comparison is just one hundred years out of date.
The Revised Statutes of 1829 are comparable to the legislation recommended by the English Real Property Commissioners of 1829-33 and
sprang from the same movement. They were somewhat more radical than
the English legislation of that time, were distinctly amateurish and breeders of disputes over words rather than realities. They have been a cause
49 Fairchild

& Springer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 570.
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for reform and not a solvent. By way of terrible example they have been
one of the strongest arguments against statutory reform. The special
course devoted to them at the Columbia Law School was long known as
"Doctrines Peculiar." They may have contributed some progressive elements to the present law of land in the United States but they have not
added to its coherence.
No general movement for title registration seems to exist in the United
States. The present movement seems local to New York and to have been
due not so much to the failure of title insurance as to the failure of the title
insurance companies because of their loans. However, the fact that a distinguished governor s° could recommend title registration, and that, after
a most devastating report,5' some at least of its advocates s2 remained not
only unconvinced but still militant, would seem to make the matter one
of more than local interest.
Some fourteen years ago, in making a study of property reform in England,5 3 the writer became interested in title registration. Struck by the
inefficacy of voluntary registration there, he secured the unprinted report
of the Iowa Commission on Land Titles of 1923-4. Nineteen states at

that time had title registration acts.5 4 In fourteen of these states the use
of title registration, if not negligible, had been insignificant.55 In the remaining five it had apparently gained a permanent foothold-in Boston,
Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. s6 Professor Powell's
study 57 has afforded a check-up for the intervening period. During this
time, no state has adopted a Torrens Act. ss Four have repealed theirs.59
In the remaining ten of the fourteen states the insignificance of the new
system had become, if anything, more pronounced. 6" In two of the five
cities where the new system had seemed to gain a permanent foothold
(Cleveland and Los Angeles) 6' that foothold had been lost. In Cleveland
so Lehman; see Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9.
s' PoweU, op. cit. supra note 2.

s2 McDougal & Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3; Fairchild & Springer, op. cit. supra
note 3S3Bordwell, Property Reform in England, ii Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1925).
s4 Bordwell, Registration of Title to Land, 12 Iowa L. Rev. iis n. 10, i6 (1927).
ss Ibid., at 126-3o.
S' Powell, op. cit. supra note 2.
s6 Tbid., at 130-4.
s8 Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 54-6.
s9 Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 54-5. These states are Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
60oAs to Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Washington, see ibid., at 55. As to New York, see ibid., at 5361Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 54, at 126, 130-I, 134.
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there had been no new registrations since 1929,62 nor in Los Angeles County since 1933.63 Only in Boston, 64 Chicago,6 s and the twin cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul"6 had title registration held its own. In these cities it

gave no evidence of ever displacing registration of deeds or even of becoming the prevalent system.6 7 These facts speak for themselves. Voluntary
registration of title has been almost as much a failure in the United States
as it was in England until under the stimulus of compulsory registration
in the County of London, the neighboring counties apparently saw the
handwriting on the wall and resorted more freely to the voluntary register."
The failure of the voluntary Torrens System in the United States up
to this time, as evidenced by its disuse, does not seem to be seriously questioned by Professor Powell's critics. Fairchild and Springer ask: If compulsion has made title registration work in England, why should it not do
the same in the United States?6 9 McDougal and Brabner-Smith say: "Indeed, the chief merit in Professor Powell's book is in its unwitting demonstration, by the data on non-use, of the great need either to make registration compulsory or to provide a mode of voluntary initial registration so
62 Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61, 244.
63Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at ioo n. 36. The figures are for the three years 1934-7.
64 Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61, 184-6.
6

op. cit. supra note 2, at 6o-i, 143-8.
2, at 6r, 2o6-o.
67 In Cook County there has been no apparent increase in the extent or value of registered
land since the report of the Iowa Commission in X923-4. See Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at
144-8. In Boston as early as 1913 there were 49,272 unregistered entires as against 5,636
registered entries so that about ten per cent of the business of Suffolk County had been shifted
to the new system and it was predicted that in ten years the amount would be not less than
twenty-five per cent. But instead of this, in 19 22 it had fallen off to about 71 per cent. Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 54, at 132. In 1936 the pendulum had swung back and there were
46,381 non-registered entries as against 7,398 registered entries (Powell, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 184 n. 51) or between thirteen and fourteen per cent of the whole but still only a gain of
s Powell,

66 Powell, op. cit. supra note

from three to four per cent over 1913. In Minneapolis, for i919-36, 10.3 per cent of all in-

struments affected registered land (ibid. at 207 n. 57), a percentage slightly less than that
of Boston for 1936. In St. Paul, for the period from 1924 to October i, 1937, registration of
27.2 per cent of the transfers indicates the highest percentage of registered land of any of
the metropolitan centers. Ibid., at n. 58. However, from 1928 to 1936 in both Minneapolis
and St. Paul neither system seems to have gained on the other. Ibid., at 210-12. In all three
metropolitan centers, therefore, the lines between registered and non-registered land seem to
be more or less definitely drawn with little prospect of any great change except through
legislation. Two types of registration in one community might be justified temporarily but
hardly as a practically permanent arrangement.
68 See supra, p. 474.
6

9 Op. cit. supra note 3, at 576. ir. Fairchild is said to be the draftsman of the Phelps-Feld
bills looking toward compulsory registration in New York City. The role of London in the
English experience is here being assigned to New York. Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 76-7.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

cheap that no opposition can preclude its public acceptance. ' ' 7° It has
been by means of a subsidy that the Torrens System has won such success
as it has had in the Twin Cities"7 and also, it would seem, in Chicago.72
If a subsidy is required to gain acceptance for the voluntary system and is
justified because of the general good, why waste further time with the
voluntary system instead of using the amount of the subsidy, if necessary,
for the establishment of the compulsory system with its greater promise of
success? The argument that would justify the subsidy would justify the
compulsion except for extremists of the old Liberal school of thought.
Such extremists no doubt still exist and would perhaps raise the question
of the constitutionality of compulsory registration of title. But can there
be any serious doubt that legislatures can change the method of land
transfer if they wish to? To ask the question is to answer it.
If voluntary title registration be rejected as impractical and compulsory registration be accepted as constitutional the question still remains:
"Why all this fuss about title registration?" The introduction of the issue
into the New York situation seems to have been entirely gratuitous. There
had been no such conspicuous failure of the recording system there or even
of title insurance as to discredit either. Title insurance had been profitable, perhaps too much so, but the title insurance companies had been allowed to do a banking business as well and banks everywhere went down
in the depression. The moral would seem to be to separate title insurance
from banking. That moral was immediately accepted 3 but in some way
title registration was lugged in."4 Elsewhere the failure of voluntary registration shows that there is no such dissatisfaction with the recording
system as to cause a demand for something else. Perhaps this is because
the public does not know, but if so, there will have to be a long and intensive educational campaign before compulsory registration of title is
accepted.
7oMcDougal & Brabner-Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, at

1r49.

71In the three counties in which Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth are situated the examiners' fees are paid by the county but not elsewhere in the state. Bordwell, op. cit. supra
note 54, at 132-3; see also Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 206 n. 56, and 218 n. 64.
72 In Illinois the examiner's fee is fixed by statute at a price often far less than would be
charged by a private examiner and, it is said, at a loss to the county. Powell, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 156. The county also supplies a "real estate inspector" and thus saves the applicant
the cost of a survey. Ibid. Against the loss in the creation of a title plant is set off its probable
profit when completed. Ibid., at 158 n. 127.
73See Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8. By the Insurance Law, in effect January i, 1940,
the power of title insurance companies to guarantee mortgages is denied. §§ 432,436,439.
74 Most of the bills presented in the New York legislature were the outcome of WPA Project
No. 61oi. Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 76-7. A great many studies were made but they are
not readily available.
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In such an educational campaign as that suggested, the burden of
proof in normal times would be on those urging the change. It is commonly argued in support of title registration that, after the initial transfer, there will be cheaper and more expeditious transfers, greater liquidity and utilization of land, and greater security of credits. None of these
merits has been so obvious in Boston, Chicago, and the Twin Cities,
where title registration must by this time be well known, as to cause any
great rush to the register. Greater liquidity and utilization and security
would seemingly add so much to the value of the land that in those
cities a far-seeing realty operator would not hesitate a minute in making
the transfer and soon the idea would become known that land was more
valuable registered than unregistered. But no such idea appears to prevail. Land is not as liquid as a share of stock and never will be. It is
essentially a local commodity. If greater utilization and security were
needed, the need would be felt most in places like the Chicago Loop
where skyscrapers abound and mortgages are heavy. But we are told
that the land in the Loop is not registered.75 If the land market is right,
land is liquid provided the title is marketable or the land is not tied up
in settlement. If the land market is not right, no register will make the
land liquid nor will the register make a non-marketable title marketable
except in much the same way as an action to quiet title will make it
marketable. Settled land is a question by itself. It can be made alienable
without a register if this be desired. Extravagant claims of this kind made
for the register are a reflection of the greater fight made for free trade in
land in England. The claims for the register there are much more modest
in recent years. No millenium will be wrought by a register of title. More
substantial arguments for registration seem to be its relative cheapness in
the long run, the greater rapidity of transfer, and the saving of lost motion.
Much of the talk about the necessity of repeated searches of the title
in the United States is lifted bodily from the English experience and has
no proper application here. In parts of England where registration of
title does not prevail, all depends upon the preservation of the title deeds
and they must be re-examined on each transaction. 76 The English abstract is a mere guide to the deeds 77 The abstract in the United States,
however, is an abstract of the record and the search does not normally go
behind it. No new abstract is normally required for each new transac7s

Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 148.

76 See i Williams, Vendor and Purchaser i57 ( 4 th ed. 1936).

77 Its purpose is "to facilitate the task of judging the effect of the title deeds." Ibid., at 123.
However, the purchaser's conveyancing counsel apparently sees only the abstract. Ibid.,
at 130.
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tion, but the old abstract is brought down to date.78 An abstract once
passed upon by a competent lawyer presents little difficulty. Where
title insurance prevails and policies are re-issued there is even less lost
motion. 79 The reports of lost motion under the present system are much
exaggerated.
Conveyancer, abstracter, and examiner, and even title insurance are
accustomed features of the present system, ° and these, it is thought,
are an unnecessary expense. The need for the abstracter and abstract
books arises from the inadequate alphabetical index which is the mark of
the official system. Deeds are indexed under grantor and grantee instead
of by tracts or by lots and the search under these names is wearisome
and unsatisfactory. Many courts have added to the difficulty by charging
the purchaser with notice of transactions entered into by a grantor long
before he was the record holder and of transactions of his, prior in time
but not recorded till long after he ceased being record holder. To supplement the official index, abstract books with tract or lot indexes8 ' have
been worked out over the years by private concerns in a great part of the
United States. 82 The person who attempts to make an abstract without
such books and from the official records alone is known as a "curbstoner"
8
and, at least in the Middle West, is not in high repute. 3
The abstracter is held to a high degree of accuracy14 even though his
78The distinction between the conveyancer method of assuring title and the abstract opinion
method is drawn in Gage, Assuring Agencies in the United States (1937). It is said that the
former "has successfully withstood the encroachments of substitute methods in New England, particularly in Boston, and in many of the states along the Atlantic seaboard. In general it may be said to have persisted in those districts of the East and South where the
number of land transfers has not been unduly large." Ibid., at 42. The latter is "the
prevailing method in Florida, Ohio, Indiana, Mfichigan, Wisconsin and in all states west of
the Mississippi to the Pacific Coast, with the exception of California." Ibid., at 64. Title insurance is given as the prevailing method in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and California. Ibid.,
at i56. The abstract opinion method is marked by the existence of title plants. Ibid., at 44.
"The giving of an abstract" is not peculiar to the abstract-opinion method but "was but a step
in the refinement of the conveyancer method of title assuring." Ibid., at 43.
79Landels, A Brief Review of the Torrens Experiment in the United States, An Address
given at the California Land Title Association, Santa Barbara, California, May 3, June x
and 2, 1938, p. 7.
8oNote 78 supra.
11See Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 46.
82Note 78 supra.
8

3Jackson, The Curbstoner's Unreliability, 24 Lawyer and Banker 331 (1931). See also
Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 56 n. 28.
84 In Dickle v. Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 433, 14 S.W. 896 (i8go) the court said: "To
furnish abstracts of titles is a business. Parties undertaking it assume the responsibility of
discharging its duties in a skillful and careful manner. Patience in the investigation of records
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liability is usually confined to those in privity of contract with him.5
The abstract is not like a covenant which runs with the land.8 6 Furthermore the abstracter may not have the means to make a judgment
against him worth anything. If the abstracter is a natural person and
not a corporation, his death will further complicate matters. To insure
proper responsibility some sort of a bonding arrangement for abstracters
seems to be a minimum requirement.8? Perhaps more important, however, would be some test of competence insured by the requirement of
88
a license.
The abstracter may or may not be a lawyer. His is the preliminary
work of assembling the matters of record affecting the land, not the ultimate task of passing on the marketability of the title. That is a task for
a competent lawyer, for whether the title is marketable or not depends
upon whether a court would force it on an unwilling purchaser, and predicting what courts will do requires skill and judgment of a high order.
Provided he shows the proper skill the lawyer cannot be held to account
because his prediction fails to materializeb and the court holds the title
unmarketable. To be on the safe side, however, the lawyer is likely to
be somewhat conservative and to refuse to approve a title which he
himself as a judge might hold good. The marketability of a title is not a
matter of mathematical certainty.
The risk that a title may not turn out to be marketable has led to
title insurance. This is an extension of the protection given the puris the main capacity required. There is no professional opinion. The agent has only to furnish

the facts from the Rlegister's office, without concern for their legal effect. Upon the facts
furnished, the purchaser must determine for himself on their sufficiency. The abstract
company collects the evidence, and for such collection it is entitled to its fee. If it makes a
mistake or oversight, as in this case, it must respond to the injured party." See also Wacek
v. Frink, 5r Minn. 282, 284, 53 N.W. 633 (1892).
ss White, Legal Liability of Abstracters and Title Companies, 9 Title News, No. io, at 5, 6
(i93o). But "most, if not all, states which have bonded abstracters have by statute abolished
the rule requiring privity of contract." Ibid.
86
Phillips, Liability of Abstracters, 5 Title News, No. 8, at 4, 8 (1926), predicts that
eventually it will become settled that if the abstracter's certificate recites that it is for the benefit of the person relying thereon, the latter "may have relief under the doctrine of a contract
made for the benefit of third persons" and that in the absence of such a recital the courts
will take judicial notice of the custom in the United States that the abstract is prepared for
third persons as well as for the owner and that "a primary obligation from the very nature of
the work will be held to be created between the abstracter and such third person."
87 In 1937, there were bonding laws in eleven states. Gage, op. cit. supra note 77, at 53.
88Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 5--6.
89 For the liability of an attorney passing defective title, see 5 A.L.R. r389 (1920); Citizens
Loan Fund & Savings Ass'n of Bloomington v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1889).
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chaser by the covenants for title included in the ordinary warranty deed.
The warranty commonly gives no protection for subsequent improvements or the increased value of the land.9 and the warrantor may not be
financially responsible. If the warrantor is an established corporation
the latter difficulty may not be so great but the limited liability still remains. Title insurance has consequently had a considerable vogue 9' especially in metropolitan centers. 92 There, improvements loom large and
the risk of unmarketable title may well be covered as an incident of business. In rural sections, it seems that title insurance has as yet largely
to make its way 93 although statistics are inadequate.94 In some respects
title insurance seems to have lost ground. Writing in 1937, Professor

Gage expressed the opinion that it had reached its zenith in I93o. 9
Doubtless the depression and the failure of outstanding title insurance
companies had much to do with this. At that time it is said to have been
universally available through the New York Title and Mortgage Company which offered to underwrite title risks anywhere in the United
States96 On the reorganization of that company, however, its nationwide business was dropped 97 and it seems to be accepted that "title insurance is inherently a local business." 98 It may be state-wide and even
go beyond state lines 99 but like the land which it concerns it is essentially
a local commodity. In about a quarter of the states there seem to be no
local companies.-

°

Where the title insurance company is strictly local,

as in the large cities, it may well combine the work of abstracter, attorney, and insurer and thus effect economies; but where this is not the case,
title insurance would seem to be just an added item to the expense of
land transfer.
Perhaps the most obvious criticism of the existing order is the inadequate official index. If the official alphabetical index is inadequate why
not get one that is adequate? Private enterprise has supplemented the
90See Davis v. Smith, 5 Ga. 274 (1848); Handler, Cases on Vendor and Purchaser 71o and
714 n. 92 (1933).
91It was statewide in only California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Gage, op. cit. supra
note 78, at 156.
92These metropolitan centers are scattered throughout the United States. Ibid.
93 Notwithstanding the ascription of state-wide title insurance to Pennsylvania (note 91
supra) all that Umsted, of Philadelphia, could say in 1930 was "the smaller towns are taking up title insurance." zo Title News, No. i,at 53 (1930).
94 See Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 85.
96 Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 85, 1i9.
97 Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 120.
95Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 85.
98Note 78, at 120. Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 120.
99Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at i2o.
100 Gage, op. cit. supra note 78, at 85 n. 24.

REGISTRATION OF TITLE

official index with its abstract books but why not take over this private
enterprise? This would be merely an attempt to better what is now
being done badly by the government, not a departure into new fields.
A very considerable profession, that of the private abstracter, would be
eliminated, but such eliminations are often the price of progress. Many
of the abstracters no doubt would find employment in the public service
and some of the existing abstract books would have to be purchased. It
would be sheer waste for the government to duplicate abstract books
where there are already adequate ones in existence. There would thus
be considerable expense in starting the new official index and no doubt
considerable added expense in keeping it up to date, but the cost of
the abstract to the purchaser would largely be eliminated although some
of this expense would be thrown on the state. There would be the further
advantage that public officials are bonded and so responsibility is ensured.
Aside from the heartburnings incident to the elimination of an honorable profession, the objection has been urged that better officials are
needed to make the change a success. The alphabetical index is fairly
mechanical. The making of an abstract book or tract index, it is urged,
is another matter. Nothing like the same skill would be required, however, as is required in passing on the marketability of the title. The
latter would still be work for a competent laywer. And title insurance
would still have its place, though any monopoly based on possession of
abstract books would be avoided.
Advocates of title registration have claimed the official tract index as
a species of title registration.-oI Statistics and statements as to title registration should be read with this in mind. So defined, title registration is
certainly not revolutionary. But it is a far cry from the Torrens System
and it is with the Torrens System or something very much like it that
title registration is identified in the United States. Were the tract index
adopted, an unofficial index would be made official and that would be
all. The general land law would not be affected.
As distinguished from mere tract indexing, title registration proper,
excluding the registration of possessory titles, involves a determination
of title. The proceeding is much like the statutory proceeding to quiet
'or Hogg, Registration of Title to Land throughout the Empire 1 (1920): "By deed registration-or registration of deeds-is meant primarily a system under which instruments are
recorded merely as such, and not with special reference to the land they purport to affect. By
title registration-or registration of title-is meant primarily a system under which a record
is made of the title to some particular land as vested in some particular person for the time
being, or of instruments as affecting some particular land." McDougal & Brabner-Smith,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 1126 n. 5, 1 t30, ii49, apparently use title registration in the same sense.
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title to be found especially in the western states. 0 2 The choice between
registration of title and the action to quiet title is likely to depend on
their relative cheapness.0 3 The need of some more adequate method of
trying title to land than the old action of ejectment is evident. It was
not open to the one in possession and years might pass before the one in
possession was given the opportunity to test his title in court. The result,
°
when one did get into court, might be res judicata between the parties 4
but the parties were limited in numberlos and the world at large was unaffected. In the statutory action to quiet title, the one to bring the action
is normally the one in possession and the parties to the action are made
so inclusive as to give it nearly, if not quite, the effect of an action binding
the whole world.' 6 The desirability of some such proceeding is manifest.
Once title is quieted there will be little trouble about its further marketability. It is one thing, however, to be forced into such a proceeding by
a compulsory registration statute and another to enter upon it voluntarily. If there is compulsion the state ought to bear much of the expense,
while if the proceeding is voluntary the expense should be met as in any
other voluntary litigation.
The arguments for an adequate official index to the Register and for a
comprehensive action to quiet title are therefore very strong. To the
writer it would seem that these should be tried before anything more
revolutionary is attempted. The tendency to look to foreign models is
not always a desirable one. To change the figure, other people's pastures
are likely to look greener than ours, but the greenness is often an illusion.
The Torrens System is a foreign system, admirable no doubt in its time
and place, but uncalled for in the United States. The agitation for it in
New York would seem a passing phase of politics.107
- Pomeroy, Code Remedies § 266 (5th ed. 1929).
103See Powell, op. cit. supra note 2, at 62, and 206 n. 56.
104 See Sedgwick & Wait, Trial of Title to Land §§ 43-4 (2d ed. 1886).
10SIbid., at §§ 26o-i.

o6 Pomeroy, Code Remedies § 266 (5th ed. 1929).
Many of the phases of Title Registration are here untouched. One of these is the con-
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clusiveness of the certificate. Another is the favor shown to the purchaser. Another is the
tendency to shift burdens, hitherto considered private, onto the public. Regardless of the
conclusiveness of the certificate, of the desirability of cutting off stale claims and of the modern tendency to look to the state, the case for the adoption of the Torrens System in the
United States does not seem to be made out.

